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MORTGAGE ACCELERATION: THE
LENDER'S PRESCRIPTION FOR
AVOIDING THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE CLEANUP
AND LIABILITY ACT (CERCLA)
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Cleanup and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 to charge potentially responsi-
ble parties2 with the duty of cleaning up hazardous waste. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently sought to re-
cover the costs of environmental cleanup from banks that foreclosed on
land containing hazardous wastes. In effect, the EPA reasoned that a
secured lender who forecloses upon property is a potentially responsi-
ble party liable for the cleanup expense.3
The EPA's actions caused panic among the nation's bankers. Legal
experts advised banks to avoid accepting potentially hazardous secur-
ity.4 Unfortunately, thousands of banks have already extended such
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1986 & Supp. I 1987)).
2. See infra notes 29-31, 33, 52 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Andresky, Cover Your Assets, 137 FORBES, Mar. 24, 1986, at 117;
Bohannon, Superfund and the Banking Industry, 50 TEx. B.J. 1215 (1987); Burcat,
Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other Deep
Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986); Shea, Protecting Lenders Against Environmental
Risks, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. May 1987, at 11; General Policy, Banks Increasingly at
Risk From Liability for Pollution Problems, Banking Official Says, 17 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1624 (1987); Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Fear
of Foreclosure]; Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in
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loans. In addressing this problem, this Note advances a theory to avoid
EPA cost recovery actions for lenders who have unknowingly5 ex-
tended credit secured by hazardous property.6
Part I discusses the legislative history of CERCLA. Part II synthe-
sizes this legislative history with the statutory structure of CERCLA.
Part III examines how the courts apply CERCLA's liability scheme to
the nation's lenders and the congressional response. Part IV reviews
the principles behind acceleration. Part V investigates the use of accel-
eration as a method of avoiding lender liability for hazardous
collateral.
I. CERCLA: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1942,' the Hooker Chemical Company began dumping waste into
an abandoned canal. In 1953, an elementary school was built atop the
canal site. Signs of trouble were largely ignored until the spring of
1978.8 By then, highly toxic chemicals had infiltrated many area
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987) [hereinafter Note, When a
Security Becomes a Liability]; Note, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Lia-
bility Under CERCLA of a Post-Disposal Toxic Waste Site Purchaser, 8 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 179 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Liability Under CERCLA]; Comment, The Impact
of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lend-
ing Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879 (1987) (these articles
warn banks to avoid potentially hazardous loans).
5. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text discussing the lender's duty to in-
vestigate the collateral before using it as security. This Note applies to those lenders
who accepted possibly hazardous security before this duty arose.
6. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
7. Brown, Love Canal USA, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 23. Ap-
parently, no one knows exactly when Hooker dumped the chemicals. See S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 848] (citing Brown's
article, supra).
8. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 7, at 4. Several events happened in 1978. For exam-
ple, amid assurances from government officials that their water was safe to drink, citi-
zens in Toone, Tennessee found their water supply contaminated by a chemical facility
that closed six years earlier. Id. Later in 1978, the EPA found that the Cedar River,
near Charles City, Iowa, contained poisons that leached from a nearby dumpsite. Id. at
5. Finally, near the close of 1978, about 25 miles south of Louisville, Kentucky, chemi-
cal manufacturers disposed of 17,000 drums at a seven-acre site. Id. Six thousand
drums in this area, which became known as the "valley of the drums," oozed toxic
chemicals into the ground. Id. See Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENrvL. L. 1, 25 (1982). Senator Moynihan was especially concerned with
the Love Canal and other events of 1978 and wanted to prevent any reoccurances. Id.
See 126 CONG. Rac. S14,965, 14969-73 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Moynihan).
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homes and startling health problems developed.9 Subsequently, Presi-
dent Carter declared a state of emergency, ° and the state evacuated
neighborhoods along the polluted land known as the Love Canal. 1
Motivated by public concern12 over the Love Canal, Congress hast-
ily fashioned a bill to address this environmental problem. 1" The only
controlling legislation in effect at the time, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA),14 could not cure the problem because it
established no liability for wastes dumped prior to its enactment. 15
Senate leaders were eager to create retrospective legislation.' 6 The
9. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 7, at 9. The New York Health Department investi-
gated and discovered birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormalities, sores,
rectal bleeding, headaches - not to mention undiscovered, but possibly latent illnesses.
Id. All of these illnesses presumably were caused by Hooker's release. For an exami-
nation of the health hazards imposed by toxic wastes, see Toxic TORTS: PROPOSALS
FOR COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS (1984); Note, Developments in Victim Compensa-
tion Legislation: A Look Beyond the Superfund Act of 1980, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
271 (1986) (strategies for victim compensation).
10. 126 CONG. REc. 30,938 (1980). On August 7, 1978, President Carter declared
a state of emergency. Id. The United States Senate approved by a voice vote a "sense of
Congress" which accepted that a serious environmental disaster occured and that fed-
eral aid should be forthcoming. Id.
11. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 7, at 9. See also L. GIBBS, LOVE CANAL, My
STORY (1982) (Lois Gibbs recounts her life as a former Love Canal resident).
12. The events surrounding Love Canal prompted many people to organize in an
effort to prevent similar occurences. See Freudenberg, Citizen Action for Environmental
Health: Report on a Survey of Community Organizations, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 444
(1984) (several citizen groups evolved from the Love Canal disaster).
13. See Grad, supra note 8, at 2. See also IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 4A.04[2] (1981) (only 11 days passed between the bill's introduction
and presidential approval); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is . .. a hastily drawn piece of
compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions .. ");
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("[CER-
CLA] is vague and its legislative history indefinite."); J. MERINGOLO, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF CERCLA (1981).
14. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, PuB. L. No. 94-580, §§ 1001-8007, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976)).
15. See Dore, The Standard of Civil Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity,
Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 260 (1981) (RCRA a prospec-
tive regulatory statute). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Congress successfully drafted retrospective legislation. See St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, Feb. 24, 1988, at A1, col. 5 (although Congress passed CERCLA about 27 years
after Hooker dumped the waste, the court held its parent, Occidental Petroleum, lia-
ble); Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J.
66, 67 (1987) (quoting Roger Schwenke) ("In many of these sites the hazardous waste
1989]
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Senate also recognized that there was a shortage of cleanup re-
sources." Moreover, insufficient legal remedies for collecting cleanup
costs from the owners of hazardous waste sites plagued RCRA. 8
Senator Robert C. Byrd moved for consideration of Senate Bill 1480
during a Democratically controlled lame-duck Congress.19 He offered
the bill as the last effort by the Ninety-Sixth Congress to address haz-
ardous waste.20 As a revenue measure, this bill had to originate in the
House of Representatives.2" Many House members considered the bill
seriously flawed 22 but conceded it was the best solution. Less than a
week after its passage in the House,23 President Carter signed the bill
into law.24
II. CERCLA: THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Public Law 96-510 is known as the "Superfund" because it reserves
was deposited 40 or 50 years ago... but if the contamination is discovered in 1987...
the present owner is one of the legally responsible parties."). See infra note 123.
17. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 7, at 10. Funds are insufficient for the expensive
remedies needed to solve hazardous chemical contamination problems. The Senate Re-
port offers an example: "The EPA has spent a total of $30 million at Love Canal ...
[but] the total costs of Love Canal alone are expected to reach $125 million." Id. at
11.
18. Id. There is no general federal law establishing liability for accidents or other
incidents involving hazardous substances. Id. So, even when a responsible company is
identified, recovering cleanup costs and damages can be extremely difficult or impossi-
ble. Id.
19. 126 CONG. REc. S14,929 at 14,948 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
20. See Note, Liability Under CERCLA, supra note 4, at 168 (Republican domina-
tion of the Senate following 1980 election created an insensitivity toward environmental
issues).
21. See Grad, supra note 8, at 25 (recognizing that the bill was a revenue measure);
R. NADER, THE RALPH NADER CONGRESS PROJECT, THE REVENUE COMMITTEES
(1975) (for no particular reason, other than tradition, the House Appropriations Com-
mittee acts first on all spending bills); R. FENNO JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE
(1966) (the House is not only the first legislative body to act on revenue measures, but
the most important one as well).
22. 126 CONG. REc. H11,790 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). See 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03[8], at 3-158.16(1) (1981) (noting the remarks of Con-
gressman Broyhill). The floor leader asserted several flaws, including spending, evi-
dence, damages, and executive discretion. He was concerned that the tax would create
a bottomless trust fund giving the EPA unlimited spending authority.
23. 126 CONG. REc. H1,802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
24. Id President Carter signed the bill on December 11, 1980, and the measure was
marked as Public Law No. 96-510. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980) (codification
of PuB. L. No. 96-5 10).
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1.6 billion dollars for cleanup activities.2 5 Industry taxes and general
federal appropriations supply most of the money.26 By financing the
fund through industry taxes, the Senate sought to convey a message of
responsibility to industrial polluters.2 7
CERCLA imposes liability28 for cleanup expenses upon three
broadly defined classes of persons connected to the waste disposal: site
owners or operators,29 generators,3 0 and transporters. 3 1 Courts gener-
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) (1980), 126 CONG. REc. 30,935 (1980). Congress initially
authorized $220 million of general revenues and $1.38 billion of excise taxes on petro-
leum products and certain inorganic chemicals to fund the program. Id.
26. 126 CONG. REc. 30,935 (1980).
27. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 7, at 72. Financing the fund through industry taxes
presents the most equitable and rational method of broadly spreading the costs of past,
present, and future releases of hazardous waste. This method of financing tells the pol-
luters that the longer they allow hazardous waste to appear, the longer they will be
financially responsible for the result. See Garrett, Superfund: Apportionment of Liabilty,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 25 (Fall 1985) (the "polluter pays" principle).
28. See infra note 123 discussing the statute's imposition of strict liability. See gen-
erally Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Expanding Liability and Diminish-
ing Defenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 289 (1987) (general overview of
CERCLA's liablity scheme).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(2) (1980 & Supp. I 1987). This section provides in per-
tinent part:
(a) Covered persons; scope
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.
Several cases have addressed the scope of this term. See, e.g., N.Y. v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (current owner of facility responsible even if owner
not in possession at time of release); Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County,
659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987) (county can be a covered person); State v. Bunker
Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (definition of owner includes parent com-
pany's liability for its subsidiary); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (a person need not be both owner and operator to assume
liability).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1980). This section provides in pertinent part:
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances...
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1980). This section provides in pertinent part:
4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which
19891
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ally have found that a bank can be a site owner under CERCLA.32
Few loan officers could have imagined potential environmental liability
arising out of a mortgage agreement. Relying on the "security interest
exemption,",33 bankers believed that they could foreclose on hazardous
waste sites with impunity. 34 Nevertheless, because of the tremendous
costs 35 associated with environmental cleanup, the nation's lenders face
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
32. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D.
Md. 1986) (bank liable upon foreclosure); but see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (bank not liable upon foreclosure if
it promptly transferred possession). See generally Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund"
and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41
Bus. LAW. 1133, 1138-45 (1986); Comment, Fear of Foreclosure, supra note 4, at 16.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1980). This section provides in pertinent part:
(20)(A) "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person own-
ing, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and
(iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandon-
ment. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the man-
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility (emphasis added).
Id
34. See Burcat, supra note 4, at 509; Hinds, Liability Under Federal Law for Haz-
ardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 24 (1982); Lotz, Liability Issues
Under CERCLA, 1982-1983 A.F.L. Rnv. 370, 407 (parties acted under belief their ac-
tions in accord with law and no liability would result). Burcat notes that none of these
articles indicates that anyone believed the courts would hold a bank liable for the haz-
ardous security. See infra note 130 and accompanying text, indicating banks knew that
control in the debtor's affairs could create liability.
35. The EPA estimates that the average expenditure per CERCLA site is roughly
$12 million. See Amendment to National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency
Plan: The National Priorities List, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,320, 40,325 (1984). EPA projec-
tions show that the cost of remedying 1800 of the most threatening sites will require an
expenditure of $23 billion. See EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RE-
SPONSE, EXTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS RELEASE PROBLEM AND FUTURE FUNDING
NEEDS CERCLA § 301(a)(1)(C) STUDY, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 1984). The Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment estimates that cleaning up the 10,000 existing
CERCLA sites could cost $100 billion and require 50 years to accomplish. See CON-
GRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 3 (1985).
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liability under CERCLA, sometimes in less than obvious
circumstances.3 6
Initially, the courts accepted a bank's argument that it was not an
owner because the security interest exemption protected the security
interest. 7 Consequently, a secured lender was not liable upon foreclo-
sure for cleanup costs. In April 1986, however, the court in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 38 shocked bankers across the
country by holding that foreclosing lenders are subject to CERCLA
liability.39 The lender became an "owner" by foreclosing and taking
title to the distressed site. 4' "Control" principles41 increased lenders'
uncertainty about the extent of their liability. The speed with which
Congress drafted Superfund legislation left it unsupported by legisla-
tive history on this issue.42
On October 17, 1986, the Superfund Amendment and Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA)4 3 became the first amendment to CERCLA. Con-
gress recognized that the original 1.6 billion dollars allocated to the
36. See, e.g., State v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986) (parent
liable for its subsidiary); United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,895, 20,897 (D. S.C. 1984) (sublessor liable for hazardous
waste disposal caused by sublessee); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698, 20,698-99 (D. S.C. 1984) (defendant may be liable when it acted
as "conduit" in transfer of CERCLA property and held title for one hour); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo.
1984), reh'g denied en banc, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987) (vice president and major
shareholder responsible for wastes disposed by corporation).
37. See, eg., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992,
20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The Mirabile court found little difficulty in construing the
security interest exemption in favor of the bank. Judge Newcomer felt that the exemp-
tion plainly allows a secured creditor to foreclose, provided that he does not become
overly entangled in the day-to-day management of the business. Id See also Lundgren,
Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 523
(1984). See supra note 33 for the text of the security interest exemption.
38. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 579.
41. Rather than basing their decisions upon the exact point in time in which title
passes, both the Long court and the Mirabile court relied upon the lender's control of
the day-to-day operations of the facility. Although Maryland Bank took a conservative
approach placing primary emphasis upon passage of title, elements of "control" were
still present in the court's analysis. See Part III of this Note for a discussion that title is
the only appropriate consideration.
42. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980 & Supp. 1 1987)).
1989)
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"Superfund" was insufficient' and through the amendments allocated
8.5 billion dollars for cleanup action.45 In CERCLA's first six years,
poor management 46 destroyed public confidence in the EPA.47 To re-
store public confidence, the EPA adopted a "get tough" attitude
against potentially responsible parties.48
Congress apparently agreed with EPA's approach to cost recovery
actions. 49 Congress went one step beyond Maryland Bank"° by re-
moving the "security interest exemption"51 from the definition of
44. See Moskowitz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA Against Innocent Owners of
Property, 19 LOYOLA L.A.L. REV. 1171 (1986); See also S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 12 (1985) where the Senate Committee on Finance noted:
It is now clear that the current Superfund program [CERCLA] will not be ade-
quate to achieve the goals of the 1980 act. The EPA estimates that only 15 of the
538 sites not on the National Priority List will be cleaned by September 30, 1985,
and that the unobligated balance of the Superfund will be less than $10 million on
that date.
Id. at 12.
45. See Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Pro-
cedures Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101, 10,102 (1987) (noting probable effects of increased capital upon
the EPA).
46. See Rogers & Darrah, RCRA Amendments Indicate Hill Distrust of EPA, Legal
Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at 28.
47. See 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1435 (1982). Charges of mismangement led to the
resignation of Anne Burford, the EPA Administrator. Id. Congress held her in con-
tempt for witholding hazardous waste enforcement documents. Id. See also 14 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1417 (1983) (Congress investigated political manipulation and conflict of
interest problems in top EPA officials).
48. Prior to SARA's enactment, the EPA's regional offices were reluctant to utilize
the imminent and substantial endangerment provisions of CERCLA § 106 to compel
potentially responsible parties to initiate cleanups. With $8.5 billion to spend, and the
EPA's management pushing for cleanups, the EPA is likely to clean up the site. Fol-
lowing the cleanup, the EPA recovers its expenses under CERCLA § 107. Because the
cornerstone of strict liability is still intact, the EPA's "get tough" policy is assured
reimbursement.
See Memorandum from J. Winston Porter, Assistant Admistrator for Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, EPA, to Regional Administrators, et. al., Re: Implementa-
tion Strategy for Reauthorized Superfund: Short Term Priorities for Action (Oct 24,
1986) (on file with author).
49. Congress adopted the EPA's Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy of December
5, 1984, and many of the Agency's other settlement procedures. See Mays, supra note
45, at 10,101. See also EPA Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034
(1985); Atkeson, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,360 (1986).
50. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
51. See supra note 33 for the text of the exception.
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-owner or operator."52 The overall effect of this removal is uncertain,
but it clearly eliminates the only proven method for the nation's lend-
ers to avoid CERCLA's liability.53 The EPA considers any bank that
forecloses and takes title to be liable as an owner under CERCLA.5"
Section 107(b) of CERCLA provides an affirmative defense for the
foreclosing lender." Defendants may assert this affirmative defense by
establishing a complete lack of causal nexus between their actions, or
inactions, and the actual or threatened hazardous waste release at is-
sue.56 This defense is virtually unavailable to banks57 for two reasons.
52. See supra note 33 for the old definition of owner or operator. The new definition
provides:
(20)(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any
person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of
an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means
to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated or other-
wise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1 1986).
53. See infra notes 55-61 indicating that essentially no affirmative defense is avail-
able to the bank.
54. 632 F. Supp. at 540. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. See also
Comment, Fear of Foreclosure, supra note 4, at 10,166 (lenders should not foreclose or
title will vest, resulting in liability).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (b)(l)-(4) (1980). The statute provides in part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person other-
wise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contrac-
tual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the defendant (except where
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tarriff and acceptance for
carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazard con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance,
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against
forseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could forseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
See supra note 29 for the text of section (a) of the statute.
56. The following cases have examined the scope of the § 107 (b)(3) defense: N.Y.
v Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1985) (defense available only if
hazardous waste was dumped during defendant's ownership); United States v. Argent
Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616 (D. N.M. 1984) (lessor held contractu-
19893
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First, the defense requires that the lender be someone "other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, or one whose act or omission oc-
curs directly or indirectly with the defendant." 58 The mortgage agree-
ment creates a "contractual relationship" that abrogates the "innocent
owner defense."59 Second, in the context of successor landowner liabil-
ity, the scope of this defense is extremely limited. The defendant must
show that he had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the haz-
ardous condition at the time he acquired the property.' This places an
affirmative duty upon lenders to inquire into the previous ownership
and uses of the property. A lender who failed to inquire-as most
have-will be unable to raise the defense.61
ally related to lessee); United States v. S. C. Recycling & Disposal Co., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272, 20,275 (D. S.C. 1984) (site owner contractually related to
generator); but see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992,
20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (successor landowners may be able to use the defense); Cyphert
& Key, Hazardous Waste Facility Successor Liability: The Ultimate Guilt by Associa-
tion, 27 FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1985, at 18.
57. To claim the defense, the defendant must show that it exercised reasonable care
with regard to the hazardous substances, and took precautions against the acts or omis-
sions of third parties. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1980). See Note,
Liability Under CERCLA, supra note 4, at 193-95 (noting lender held to higher duty of
care).
58. See supra note 55 for text of the statute.
59. See generally Marcus, The Price of Innocence: Landowner Liability Under CER-
CLA and SARA, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 117, 130 (1987); see also Marcotte,
Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987,
at 68 (land contracts are included within SARA's definition of contractual relation).
60. 632 F. Supp. at 580. The Court in Maryland Bank had little compassion for the
lender's argument that it did not know about the hazardous waste. Judge Northrop
noted:
Mortgagees, however, already have the means to protect themselves, by making
prudent loans. Financial institutions are in a position to investigate and discover
potential problems in their secured properties. For many lending institutions such
research is routine. CERCLA will not absolve them from responsibility for their
mistakes in judgment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(a)(i) (Supp. 1987). See Vanderver,
Environmental Auditing, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 437 (J. Arbucke ed.
1983); Bleicher & Stonebake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of the Superfund and Related
Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,017 (1984)
(both publications explain general auditing procedures). See also Shea, supra note 4, at
14 (checklist for compliance with CFR regulations regarding environmental auditing).
61. The defendant must establish that no hazardous waste existed when he accepted
the mortgage. The commercial lender must make reasonable efforts to investigate the
security. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1987). The lender's duty is outlined in
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1987) which provides in pertinent part:
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III. CERCLA AND THE LENDING INSTITUTION
The CERCLA amendments removing the security interest exemp-
tion62 placed lenders in a position where foreclosure is practically un-
available. 63 Few loan officers will foreclose when unlimited liability
exists should the property prove to be contaminated. The principle un-
derlying the security interest exemption still remains, however: liabil-
ity exists when title vests and the lender accepts this vesting.64 By
comparison, title does not vest in an accelerating lender, and no liabil-
ity attaches as a result. Acceleration also avoids the Maryland Bank 61
implication of liability.
In In re T.P. Long Chemical Co., 6 6 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio concluded that costs incurred to clean up a
waste site under CERCLA were not recoverable from property in
which another creditor held a security interest.67 The court reasoned
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in
clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have under-
taken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous owner-
ship and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceeding sentence
the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the
part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable infor-
mation about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by
appropriate inspection.
Id.
See CONFERENCE REPORT, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION AcT
oF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 186-88 (1986) (parties to commercial
transaction held to higher standard).
62. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. See supra note 52 for the new definition of "owner."
63. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41. See also Letter from Samuel L. Nott,
Chief of the Superfund Branch to Ralph Ridlinghaffer, Executive Vice President,
MBank Abilene, N.A. (Feb. 22, 1985) (MBank withdrew foreclosure after recognizing
that liability would attach).
64. For a synopsis of when title passes, see G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANcE LAW §§ 4.1-4.3 (2d ed. 1985).
65. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986). Because Judge Northrop emphasized passage of title as one consideration for
determining liability, acceleration becomes an available remedy for the bank to escape
liability. By accelerating, title will not vest in the lender. See G. NELSON & D. WHIT-
MAN, supra note 64, at §§ 7.6, 7.7 (generally discussing acceleration and limitations on
its use). See also Parts IV and V of this Note discussing the use of acceleration.
66. 45 Bankr. 278, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,635 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
67. Id. at 287-89.
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that, as a security holder, the bank was not an insurer of the risks the
collateral might cause.68 By way of dictum, the court hypothesized
that even if the bank had repossessed the property, it would not be an
owner or operator under CERCLA so long as it did not participate in
the management of the facility.69 As evidenced by Maryland Bank,7 °
courts have retreated from this dictum, however.71
The T.P. Long Chemical Company, owned by T.P. Long, stored
hazardous substances72 at its facility.73 Long eventually sought Chap-
ter 11 reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code74 and listed Banc
Ohio as a secured creditor.75 As a secured creditor, Banc Ohio per-
fected its security interest in Long's accounts receivable, fixtures, waste
68. Id. at 288.
69. Id. at 288-89.
70. 632 F. Supp. at 573.
71. When SARA amended CERCLA, much of the Long holding lost its validity.
Nevertheless, the court proposed one idea that still remains: A creditor is under no
obligation to assume possession of the collateral. 45 Bankr. at 288. By refusing to
assume possession of the collateral, the bank will not acquire liability for a subsequent
cleanup. Similarly, a lender that accelerates has equally refused to assume possession of
the collateral. Thus, Long stands in support of this proposition. See also United States
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 n.6 (D. Md. 1986) (citing with
approval dictum from Long).
72. 126 CONG. Rac. 30,910, 30,911 (1980) (listing chemicals considered hazardous
and therefore subject to industry taxation). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1980 & Supp. I
1987) (defining "hazardous substances"). Thomas, What Business Clients Should Know
About the New Superfund, PRAC. REAL EsT. LAW., July 1987, at 588 (growing recogni-
tion that household trash contains numerous "hazardous substances" under
Superfund).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. 1987) defines facility as follows:
(9) The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any
vessel;
Id. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D. N.C. 1985) ("facility"
includes roadsides where polluter dumped hazardous waste); United States v. Metate
Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz 1984) (real estate subdivision can be
waste facility).
74. 45 Bankr. at 280.
75. Id. See also D. CoWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.10 (1987)
(effect of scheduling debts); 5 NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 301:4 (1987) (forms for scheduling the priorities of creditors).
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barrels, and other personal property at the site.7 6 The trustee sold all
the personal property of the estate to the Tompkins Corporation at an
auction.
77
While Tompkins' employees were removing barrels of waste at the
facility, they inadvertently opened one barrel, resulting in the release of
a hazardous substance.7 8 The EPA determined that the release war-
ranted immediate action79 and initiated cleanup of the site.80 Un-
known to Banc Ohio, 8 ' there were drums of hazardous waste buried at
the site that were subject to Banc Ohio's security interest. During the
cleanup the EPA discovered the buried drums.82 One issue 83 was
whether the EPA could recover the cost of removing the hazardous
76. 45 Bankr. at 280. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 23-11 (2d ed. 1979) (perfection by filing).
77. 45 Bankr. at 281.
78, Id. Included in the property purchased was a tank containing sulfur monochlo-
ride. Workers opened a valve on the tank, releasing the chemical. See supra note 72.
79. 45 Bankr. at 281. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (Supp. 1987) ("If the [EPA] be-
lieves that a release is about to occur, [they] may conduct an investigation to enforce the
provisions of this chapter.").
80. 45 Bankr. at 281. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). Whenever the
threat exists of a hazardous waste release, the EPA is authorized to arrange for remedial
action unless the owner or operator conducts the action himself. Id.
81. 45 Bankr. at 281. This lack of knowledge indicates that the § 107(b)(3) defense
is unavailable to the bank. See supra notes 57-61 discussing the bank's duty to inquire
regarding the debtor's activities at the site.
Arguably, the lack of knowledge is irrelevant because 42 U.S.C. § 9607 imposes strict
liability. See, eg., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D. N.J. 1983);
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (all im-
pose strict liability). See infra note 137 for further discussion of strict liability.
82. 45 Bankr. at 281. Because Banc Ohio perfected a security interest in these
drums, the EPA argued that Banc Ohio should be liable for the cleanup expenses. Id.
83. Id. The other issue addressed by the Long court was whether the cleanup ex-
penses are allowable as an administrative expense in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c)(1978) ("The trustee may recover the property securing an allowed claim [the
mortgage], the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of,
such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.").
Several cases have examined whether cleanup expenses are allowable administrative
expenses. See, e.g., In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 Bankr. 34 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (EPA
claim allowed as administrative expense having first priority); In re Charles Stevens,
Inc., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 556 (D. Me. 1987) (cost of postpetition cleanup of
prepetition environmental hazard entitled to first priority as an administrative ex-
pense); but see Southern R.R. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985)
(cleanup costs not allowable as administrative expense). This issue is not within the
scope of this Note.
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material from the property in which the bank has a security interest. 4
Relying upon the now-defunct security interest exemption,8 5 the
court held that even if Bane Ohio had repossessed its collateral pursu-
ant to its security agreement, it would not be an "owner or operator"
as defined under CERCLA.s6 Bane Ohio's recognized lack of partici-
pation in the control of the company reinforced this finding.87
The Long case lost significance with the congressional demise of the
security interest exemption. Only one portion of the opinion is un-
hampered by subsequent statutory changes.88 The Long court recog-
nized that a creditor takes a security interest in property to secure an
obligation. 9 Yet, if the collateral becomes worthless or poses a risk to
the public, the creditor is under no duty to assume possession of the
84. 45 Bankr. at 282.
85. SARA § 101 (20)(A), CERCLA § 101 (20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(1980)
(security interest exemption removed). See supra note 52 for text of the new definition.
86. 45 Bankr. at 288-89. By way of dictum, Judge White stressed that a bank could
repossess its collateral without the assumption of liability. But see United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986) (under no circum-
stances may a bank repossess hazardous collateral without assuming liability); Note,
When a Security Becomes a Liablity, supra note 4, at 1285 (discussing and adopting the
Maryland Bank result).
87. 45 Bankr. at 278. Control in the day-to-day operations of the debtor was a
factor that the Long court emphasized. Id. In accord with this idea, one author asserts
that CERCLA liability is really an advanced form of principal-agency theory. See Bur-
cat, supra note 4, at 528; In re MBank Abilene, Administrative Order Docket CER-
CLA, VI-4-85. (MBank not an owner because it did not participate in management of
debtor). See also Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 842, 474
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1984) (mortgagee became principal of mortagagor and liable for agent's
debts); A. Gay Jensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (credi-
tor, by control over debtor, became principal liable for transactions entered into by
agent, the debtor). See generally Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Rela-
tionship With its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1984); Douglass-Hamilton, Creditor
Liabilities Resulting From Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially
Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975); see also Krivo Ind. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1109 (5th Cir. 1973), modified and petition for
reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974) (if lender becomes actively involved in
debtor's affairs liability may be imposed); cf United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (no liability for lender with power
to direct management of debtor).
88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
89. 45 Bankr. at 288. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(1986), which defines a "security inter-
est" as any "interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perform-
ance of an obligation." Id The Uniform Commercial Code applies to mortgage
arrangements. See, eg., In re Equitable Dev. Corp., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1349 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1976) (security interest in land sale contract within scope of
U.C.C. art. 9).
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collateral or insure against the risk.' In effect, a lender can walk away
from a bad loan without incurring liability.9 1 The court indicated that
where there is title, there is liability.9 2 Banc Ohio did not hold title, so
it could escape liability by declining to foreclose.93
Nearly eight months after Long,94 in United States v. Mirabile, 95 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that a lender may foreclose on hazardous property and assign
such property to a third party and avoid environmental liability.96
Prior to 1976, Arthur C. Mangels, Inc. owned a site containing haz-
ardous wastes9 7 generated by Mangels' paint manufacturing business.98
Because it was stored in drums, the waste seemed harmless, so without
considering possible liability, American Bank & Trust (ABT) accepted
a mortgage and a note secured by the real estate.99
In 1976, Turco Coatings, Inc. purchased Mangels °° and produced
and stored waste in the same fashion as its predecessor. The business
was not prosperous and, to remain in business,"' Turco sought and
received the help of other lenders.1"2 Turco, still beset by financial dif-
90. 45 Bankr. at 288. In a footnote, Judge Northrop in Maryland Bank agreed,
stating, "The mortgagee also has the option of not foreclosing and not bidding at the
foreclosure sale. Both steps would apparently insulate the mortgagee from liability."
632 F. Supp. at 580 n.6.
91. See 2 C. WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE §§ 827-833 (5th ed. 1939) (lender
has no interest in the property other than as security and may release its security with
impunity).
92. By avoiding such issues as control and knowledge, and relying upon the passage
of title, banks will be able to predict when liability is and is not assumed. See, eg.,
Burcat, supra note 4, at 528. See infra note 130.
93. 45 Bankr. at 288. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94. 45 Bankr. 278, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,635 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
95. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). This Note refers only to the second Mirabile opinion.
96. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994.
97. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,992.
98. Id. at 20,993. The waste included benzene, ethylbenzene, napthalene, toluene,
and mercury. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. 1987) (defining hazardous substances).
99. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
100. Id. Turco acquired 95% of the shares of Mangels. Id. This gave Turco con-
trol over Mangels and, therefore, assumption of the note and mortgage. Id.
101. Id. at 20,996. Turco filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. This petition granted Turco a stay against all creditors, giving Turco a "breath-
ing spell" in which to reorganize its business. See generally D. CowANs, BANK-
RUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.3 (1987) (scope of automatic stay).
102. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. In 1976, Girard Bank, the prede-
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ficulties, subsequently ceased operations at the facility. 103
In 1980, ABT gave notice of foreclosure upon the property." a ABT
took title to the property after purchasing it at a sheriff's sale. 10 5 ABT
officials secured the building against vandalism, inquired as to the cost
of proposed cleanup, and occasionally showed the property to prospec-
tive purchasers. 10 6
Four months after taking title, 107 Thomas A. Mirabile, taking
through ABT, accepted a sheriff's deed to the property. 1 8 Shortly af-
ter he acquired the property, the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources asked Mirabile to remove the drums.'0 9 His efforts
proved inadequate, 1 0 prompting the EPA to examine the site and con-
cessor in interest of Mellon Bank, entered into a financing arrangement with Turco
whereby Girard would advance working capital to Turco. Id. Additionally, in July
1979, the Small Business Administration (SBA) loaned $150,000 to Turco for the retire-
ment of specified debts. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Most states have their own statutes governing the notice of foreclosure
procedure. Generally, the notice informs the public that the bank intends to sell the
property. See C. WILTSIE, supra note 91, at § 853.
105. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. See infra note 127 (when title
vests, "ownership status" is imputed, and liability exists).
106. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
107. Id. The Mirabile court emphasized the transient nature of ABT's title as evi-
dence that no ownership was intended. Id. See infra note 123 arguing that intent of
the mortgagee is irrelevant.
108. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
109. Id. at 20,993. The powers of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources are similar to those of the EPA. Nevertheless, states lack one important
resource, the Superfund. Without access to the Superfund, many states acquiesce to
EPA control of the cleanup. See generally Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooper-
ative Federalism or Federal Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1985) (section 114(c) pre-
vents states from establishing a fund that pays compensation similar to the Superfund);
but see Freeman, CERCLA Reauthorization: The Wise Demise of 114(c) and Exxon v.
Hunt, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,286 (1986) (states may, but not likely to,
create own Superfund). See also Selmi, Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Look At the
State Civil Penalty Statutes, 19 LOYOLA L.A.L. REV. 1279 (examining state environ-
mental enforcement powers); Current Developments, Cuomo Signs Legislation to Create
New York Hazardous Waste Management Plan, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1111 (1987). F.
ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW
AND POLICY 321 (1984) ("The states have the first opportunity and primary responsibil-
ity and are continuously involved in scores of environmental actions.").
110. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,993. Mirabile limited his efforts to
consolidation of the drums into a central location. Id. Furthermore, he solicited quo-
tations from various firms as to the cost of removing the drums, but took no action. Id.
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clude that immediate actions were necessary.' 1 1
The EPA disbursed Superfund dollars and filed the necessary cost
recovery action against Mirabile. 2 He joined ABT and other lenders
as third-party defendants to the action and alleged that, by virtue of
certain actions taken during their financial dealings, the lenders be-
came liable for the hazardous conditions at the site. 1
3
The court granted ABT's motion for summary judgment," 4 ac-
knowledging that CERCLA liability will attach only to a potentially
responsible party,' 1 5 which the statute defines as either an owner or an
operator.' 6 On the strength of the security interest exception, the
court found that a creditor who does not become overly entangled in
the operation of the property may not be held liable for cleanup
costs.117 The court held that ABT lacked the requisite control rela-
tionship necessary to establish "ownership.' 8  Citing legislative his-
111. Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1980) allows the EPA to recover against those who
owned or operated the site at the time the cleanup activities occurred. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2) (1980) allows similar recovery against those who owned or operated the
site at the time of disposal. See supra notes 29, 79-80 for text of the relevant provisions.
113. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. Mirabile alleged that Mellon Bank should be
liable by virtue of its advances secured by the inventory and assets of Turco. Id. Simi-
larly, Mirabile alleged that the lender should be liable because of its secured debt. In
connection with both lenders, Mr. Mirabile argued that they exhibited "control" char-
acteristics sufficient to justify liability. Id. See supra note 87 regarding "control" factor.
114. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. The court also granted the other
lender's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 20,997. Note the apparent confusion in
the court's holding. Earlier in the court's opinion, the court based its decision in regard
to ABT's motion for summary judgment solely upon lack of "control" rather than pas-
sage of title. See infra note 128. Yet, the court reverses its logic when addressing SBA's
motion for summary judgment by explaining that "[u]nlike ABT, the SBA never took
legal or equitable title to the site. In this respect, its case for summary judgment is
stronger than that of ABT." 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997. The inconsis-
tency, and resulting need for a clear test is apparent. See infra note 130.
Mellon Bank was less fortunate. Again, by placing primary reliance on the lender's
control of its debtor, the court found that a genuine issue of fact existed as to Mellon's
liability. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997. This is found even though no
title to the distressed property had or ever could have passed to Mellon. Arguably, this
court extends the scope of liability well beyond that permitted by the statute.
115. Id. at 20,996.
116. See supra notes 29 and 33 (discussing the scope of the statute).
117. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. The court not only adopts the
control" theory, but it adopts it by clearly dismissing the applicability of title. See
supra note 87 and infra note 130 discussing the agency theory.
118. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. Although ABT did come in and
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tory,'19 the Mirabile court found that Congress intended to impose
liability only upon those who were responsible for, and profited from,
improper disposal practices.12°
Because title vested in ABT, the court's logic is questionable. 121 The
court characterized the prompt exchange of title as evidence that ABT
did not intend to own the property. 12 2 A fair reading of the statute,
however, gives no indication that a party's intent is relevant.1 23 The
court's acceptance of intent as a factor opens the statute to abuse by
lenders. Lenders could foreclose, promptly transfer the property, and
remain free from liability by claiming lack of intent. Certainly, passage
"close up" the site, the court noted that this does not constitute participation in the
management of the facility.
119. H. R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6180. The legislative history provides, "In the case of the
facility, an "operator" is defined as a person who is carrying out operational functions
for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." Id.
120. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
121. Compare the court's language in infra note 128 with the language in supra note
114. Clearly the two statements are contradictory.
122. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
123. See supra notes 29 and 52 for the relevant provisions. Persuasive evidence that
the court should not consider intent comes from the statute's strict liability posture. See
126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (1980). Rep. Florio, the sponsor of the bill, responded, "Liabil-
ity [is] 'subject only to the defenses' provided in the bill .... Thus, the absence of
negligence is not a defense to liability." Id. But see 126 CONG. RC. 30,986 (1980).
Senator Stafford remarked:
We intend that the phrase "sufficient cause" would encompass defenses sqch as the
defense that the person who was the subject of the President's order was not the
party responsible under the act for the release of the hazardous substance. It
would be unfair to assess punitive damages against a party who for good reasons
believed himself not to be the responsible party.
Id.
Nevertheless, most courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose strict liability. See,
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (Congress
intended that responsible parties be strictly liable, even though Congress did not include
explicit provision for strict liablity); Stewart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596
F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979) (Congress intended strict liability); Sunnen Prod. Co. v.
Chemtech Ind., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276, 278 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (transferor is strictly liable
to transferee for the necessary costs of response); City of Philadelphia v. Stephan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (legislative history establishes Congress' under-
standing that CERCLA imposes strict liability).
See also 126 CONG. RPc. 31,966 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY AcT OF 1980 780-81 (Comm. Print 1983) (Department of Justice view that
CERCLA contemplates strict liability). See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.
TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 576 (1984).
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of title is a better indicator of ownership. Because title vests at a dis-
tinct time,124 the presence of title is a more reliable test than the pres-
ence or absence of control. 12
5
While the result seems fair,126 the logic is flawed.127 As a lender,
ABT held title to the debtor's property following foreclosure.128 Not-
ing the lack of control over the debtor's affairs, the Mirabile court re-
fused to impose liability upon ABT. 129 This control analysis distorted
the picture of lender liability.13 In an effort to clarify this picture for
124. Title vests once the mortgage debt is satisfied, or the mortgagee forecloses
upon the property. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FI-
NANCE LAW § 4.1 (2d ed. 1985). See also infra note 131. See supra note 130 (examin-
ing the amorphous nature of control analysis).
125. Compare supra note 52 for the text of the new definition of "owner or opera-
tor" with the earlier definition found supra note 33. Arguably, Congress took away any
consideration of intent or control by removing the words "primarily to protect his se-
curity interest in the vessel or facility." Under the new statute, no inquiry is made into
the creditor's primary purpose or intent. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. I 1986).
126. The result is fair, provided the reader agrees that the mortgagee's intent rather
than the acceptance of title should determine liability. Such a view comports with
Mirabile but conflicts with Maryland Bank.
127. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. Not only was American Bank &
Trust Company, the lender, the highest bidder at the sale, it subsequently informed the
Chester County Sheriff and Tax Department that it intended to take title to the prop-
erty. Id. This title would impute ownership and liability. See Artesian Water Co. v.
Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987) ("[A]fter the Site
was closed, title was transferred from the State to the County...; [flor purposes of
liability under § 107(a)(1), the County is therefore the current owner of the Site.").
128. The Mirabile court completely avoided the title issue. Instead, the court felt
that the security interest exemption plainly applied to the case at bar. Judge Newcomer
stated:
Regardless of the nature of the title received by ABT, its actions with respect to
the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest
in the property. ABT made no effort to continue Turco's operations on the prop-
erty, and indeed foreclosed some eight months after all operations had ceased.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
129. Id.
130. Control analysis involves intangible theories such as instrumentality, alter-ego,
and principal-agency. See, e.g., Krivo Ind. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F. 2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modified and reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974) (control analysis makes it difficult to define precise point at which liablity will
attach); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916) (a
lender may be liable as alter ego of corporation); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (liability arises under agency law); but see Buck v.
Nash-Finch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960) (liability does not arise under
agency law). The Jenson and Buck cases are irreconcilable. If the courts have difficulty
applying these concepts, a clearer test should be sought.
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lenders, the sole criterion should become the tangible concept of title
vesting. 3 1 Ostensibly, that was the position Congress adopted when
enacting the CERCLA amendments.
1 32
Approximately six months after Mirabile13 3 the Federal District
Court in Maryland addressed a similar issue in United States v. Mary-
land Bank & Trust Co. 134 The court defined the issue as:
Whether a bank, which formerly held a mortgage on a parcel of
land, later purchased the land at a foreclosure sale and continues
to own it, must reimburse the United States for the cost of clean-
ing up hazardous wastes on the land, when those wastes were
dumped prior to the bank's purchase of the property?
1 35
The court answered in the affirmative, 36 and this case is now the lead-
ing opinion in this trilogy.1 37 The court held that the Maryland Bank
& Trust Company (MBT) could be liable for cleanup costs because
MBT converted a security interest into full ownership.1 38 Essentially,
the title vested in MBT, making the lender the complete owner of the
property.1 39 Not only does Maryland Bank reach the correct result,
140
131. Title vests and ownership evolves at a specific, identifiable time. See 3 J. Pow-
ELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 1006(a)(1828) (mortgagee can convey
good title immediately following foreclosure).
132. See supra note 52 for the text of the new definition of owner. With the security
interest exemption removed, Congress most likely concluded that ownership was the
valid consideration. Thus, one need not look beyond the point where title and therefore
"ownership" can be imputed to the lender. See supra note 127.
133. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
134. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
135. Id. at 574.
136. Id. at 579-82.
137. See Comment, Fear of Foreclosure, supra note 4, at 10,168. (of the three cases,
Maryland Bank provides the best support for its analysis); Burcat, Foreclosure and the
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper or Learning to Dance to a
New Tune?, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,099 (1987) (through poor reason-
ing, Maryland Bank reaches the right result).
138. 632 F. Supp. at 574. See Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977)
(interest of mortgagee ripened into full title after purchase at foreclosure sale); see also
55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 785 (1971) (security terminated at foreclosure sale when it
ripened into full title).
139. 632 F. Supp. at 579. The mortgage was no longer in force, thus the mortgagee
took title through foreclosure. See Ritz v. Fitzsimmons, 57 A.D.2d 922, 395 N.Y.S.2d
49 (1977) (effect of a foreclosure sale is to vest entire interest in purchaser).
140. 632 F. Supp. at 575. Following foreclosure, a lender holds full title and is
liable for cleanup expenses. See supra note 138 explaining that the lender receives full
title upon foreclosure. See supra note 132 and accompanying text examining Congres-
sional intent.
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it does so in a fashion that accommodates the new amendments to
CERCLA. 14
1
From 1944 to 1980, Herschel McLeod owned property dubbed the
California Maryland Drum (CMD) Site.14 2 MBT loaned money to
McLeod for two of his businesses, both located on the CMD site. 143
During 1972, McLeod permitted the dumping of hazardous wastes
on the CMD site. 1" Eight years later, McLeod's son Mark obtained a
335,000 dollar loan from MBT to purchase the CMD site.145 The son
acquired the property in December 1980, was soon in arrears, forcing
MBT to foreclose on the site in 198 1.146 MBT purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale. 147 MBT took title to the property and contin-
ued as the record owner of the CMD site. 148
Four years later, the EPA learned of the wastes dumped on the
CMD site.149 Because MBT refused to clean the site, i5 ° the EPA spent
141. See supra note 53 for the new statutory language. The Maryland Bank court
placed minor emphasis upon the security interest exemption; thus, its subsequent re-
moval will not affect the validity of the opinion.
142. 632 F. Supp. at 575.
143. Id.
144. Id. The wastes included such heavy organics as toluene, ethylbenzene, and
total xylenes, and such heavy metals as lead, chromium, mercury, and zinc. Id.
145. 632 F. Supp. at 575. Maryland Bank & Trust sent the Farmers Home Admin-
istration (FmHA) a request for loan guarantees relating to this loan. Pursuant to 7
C.F.R. § 1980.101(B) (1980) the FmHA issued loan note guarantees for 90% of the
loan.
By requesting a guarantee for the note, the accelerating lender assumes one additional
burden. Specifically, the Federal Housing Adminstration (FHA) placed limits upon the
acceleration of loans they have guaranteed. Nevertheless, the burden is small and prob-
ably of no consequence to a lender that forecloses or accelerates in good faith. See
HUD HANDBOOK 4330.1 (formerly 4191.02) (FHA mortgage insurance operations).
146. 632 F. Supp. at 575.
147. Id.
148. Id. The case does not indicate whether MBT was able to transfer the property
following its payment for the cleanup. Yet, even if MBT could, the property is worth
only a fraction of its original value. See Brown, Superfund National Contingency Plan:
How Dirty is "Dirty?" How Clean is "Clean?", 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1984) (Superfund
cleanups will not require responsible parties to return site to completely clean
condition).
149. 632 F. Supp. at 575-76. Mark McLeod actually told Walter Raum, director of
Environmental Hygiene for St. Mary's County Department of Health, of the hazardous
wastes on the site. Raum contacted the EPA.
150. 632 F. Supp. at 575. Nearly all potentially responsible parties are given the
chance to cleanup the site. If liability is unavoidable, the bank should complete the
cleanup. Logically, a private sector cleanup will save money over an EPA attempt. See
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the funds allocated for cleaning up the property. After the cleanup, the
EPA sought to recover the Superfund expenditure. 51
As lenders in the two previous cases had argued, MBT claimed it
was not an "owne; or operator" '152 under CERCLA because it
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale pursuant to the security
interest exemption.15 3 The court responded that the security interest
exemption covers only those persons who, at the time of cleanup, hold
indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the
land.1 54 The court reasoned that only during the life of the mortgage
did MBT hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security
interest.'55 Because the mortgage terminated upon foreclosure, title to
this property vested in the bank upon foreclosure.' 56
The court noted that adoption of the bank's argument would convert
CERCLA into an insurance scheme for lenders,15 7 forcing the federal
government to pay cleanup costs while the mortgage-turned-owner
benefited from the cleanup by the increased value of the land.15 The
court also recognized that lenders are in a position to investigate and
Graham & Stoll, Negotiating Waste Site Cleanups, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 1986,
at 48 (private sector cleanups are cheaper and reduce litigation costs).
Furthermore, courts interpreted CERCLA to allow joint and several liability, thus
the lender may seek contribution and or indemnification from proper parties. See State
v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C. Colo. 1985); United States v. Stringfellow, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,385 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. Chem Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (cases recognizing
joint and several liability). See also Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive
Review of Settlement Procedures Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101 (1987) (examining uses of joint and
several liability).
151. 632 F. Supp. at 575-76. The EPA removed 237 drums of chemical material
and 1,180 tons of soil at a cost of $551,713.50. Imposing liability upon MBT leaves the
bank grossly undersecured.
152. See supra note 33 for text of the definition.
153. See supra note 33 for text of the security interest exemption.
154. 632 F. Supp. at 579.
155. Id. See supra note 138.
156. See supra notes 127, 138 for a discussion of foreclosure and its effect upon the
mortgagee. It is because of this result that acceleration becomes such an appealing
remedy. See also Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977) (interest of the
mortgagee ripened into full title after purchase at foreclosure sale).
157. 632 F. Supp.'at 580.
158. For a contrary view arguing that lenders will not benefit from the cleanup, see
Brown, supra note 148, at 91. See also Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical
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discover potential problems in their secured properties, and that soci-
ety should not bear the burden for their mistakes in judgment.15 9
Thus, the section 107(b)(3) defense became constructively unavailable
to the lender."6
In spite of policy implications, the court emphasized passage of ti-
tle.1 6 ' This view not only avoids the confused logic of Mirabile,1 62 but
facilitates the removal of the security interest exemption.
163
Six months after Maryland Bank, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act removed the security interest exemption from the
statute. 6I The new definition implies that ownership can be imputed
when the title vests in the lender, indicating that a lender's foreclosure
upon hazardous property will result in per se liability.1 65 Congress en-
Assessment, 41 U. OF MIAMI L. REv. 879, 899 (1987) (addressing the economic ramifi-
cations that foreclosure imposes).
159. 632 F. Supp. at 580.
160. Id. at 579. See supra note 55 for the text of § 107(b)(3), the affirmative defense.
Section 101(35)(A) of CERCLA determines to whom the defense applies:
(35)(A) The term "contractual relationship" for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3)
of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instru-
ments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the facil-
ity concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal of
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of
the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of
the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
Id. The Maryland Bank court disposed of the case by considering whether the bank was
an owner, rather than a party capable of pleading the affirmative defense. Nevertheless,
the court noted that the bank must inquire regarding the possible environmental
hazards appurtent to the property. Although reasonable, the bank failed to inquire and
is unable to maintain the defense. See Comment, supra note 158, at 894; see also supra
notes 57-61 (discussing the current unavailability of the 107(b)(3) defense).
161. 632 F. Supp. at 579.
162. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
163. Removing the security interest exception should have minimal effect upon the
Maryland Bank holding. Because the Maryland Bank court looked to passage of title,
rather than the security interest exemption, the exemption becomes meaningless. One
author agrees with this position. See Comment, supra note 158, at 894 (the subsequent
amendment will promote legislative clarity).
164. See supra note 52 for the new definition of "owner or operator."
165. 632 F. Supp. at 579. Because title is the relevant test, foreclosure necessarily
vests title in the lender. See supra note 127. Title held by the lender will result in
classification as owner and a basis for CERCLA liability.
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dorsed the Maryland Bank holding in all respects.1 66 Acceleration
nonetheless can assist the lender in avoiding cleanup liability.
167
IV. How ACCELERATION WORKS
Most commercial mortgages contain acceleration clauses 168 that
protect the lender from unusual swings in the interest rate.1 69 Further
166. The 1986 amendments to § 107 added the federal lien provision in the new
§ 107(1). This provision provides that all costs and damages for which a person is liable
to the United States under § 107(a) shall'constitute a lien in favor of the United States
upon all real property and rights to such property that belong to such person and "are
subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986).
The purpose of this change is not only to codify part of Maryland Bank, but also to
ensure that landowners whose land the EPA cleaned with Superfund dollars are not
able to reap windfall profits by selling their decontaminated property. See H.R. REP.
No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 17 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3040.
167. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
168. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND Fi-
NANCE (1985). The following is a typical commercial acceleration clause:
If undersigned shall fail... in the ... observance of any of the covenants.... the
entire principal sum... shall at once become due and payable without notice at the
option of the holder of this note... :
WITH RESPECT TO THE REPAYMENT OF THE INDEBTEDNESS
HEREBY SECURED AND PERFORMANCE OF MORTGAGOR'S OTHER
AGREEMENTS....
a) That Mortgagor shall promptly... perform and comply with.., to keeping
said premises in good order and condition....
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 289 N.C. 620, 621-22, 224 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1976).
See also J. KUSNET & J. ANTOPOL, MODERN BANKING FORMS § C1.4.10 (1981).
169. When used in this manner, an acceleration clause is more aptly referred to as a
"due on sale" clause. The lender, by preventing the transfer, may demand the mortgage
assumption at a higher rate. See, eg., LaSala v. Am. Say. & Loan Assoc., 5 Cal.3d 864,
489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (lender may enforce clause upon the further
encumbering of the property only when reasonably necessary to protect lender's secur-
ity); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Assoc., 12 Cal.3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1974) (lender may enforce clause upon mortgagor entering into installment land
contract for sale of the security only when one of lender's "legitimate interests"
threatened); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978) (lender may enforce clause upon outright sale of the security only
when reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to lender's security or risk of
default); Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30 Cal.3d 695, 639
P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982) (expanded Wellenkamp doctrine to include com-
mercial as well as residential real property, and private as well as institutional lenders).
See A. AXLEROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE
(1985). See also Comment, Acceleration Clauses as a Protection for Mortgagees in a
Tight Money Market, 20 S.D.L. REv. 329 (1975) (use of acceleration clauses in mort-
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protection comes from the mortgagee's ability to call the entire debt
due and payable in the event of a default.170 One recognized default
that will trigger acceleration is the mortgagor who commits waste.
17 1
A mortgagor who releases hazardous substances upon the property ar-
guably is liable to the mortgagee for waste of the estate.172 There is
substantially no difference between allowing a leaky roof to destroy a
building's interior and permitting hazardous waste to accumulate and
harm the property. Both acts prejudice the lender's interest.' 73 The
mortgagee should be empowered to call the entire debt due upon the
discovery of waste.
The appeal of acceleration is in the legal characteristics that are at-
tendant upon its use. Unlike foreclosure, the title remains in the mort-
gagor during acceleration. Because title remains in the mortgagor,' 74
gages to effectuate increase in interest rates); Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment
Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates -
Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 267 (1971-72) (interaction of the due on
sale clauses and prepayment penalties); Comment, Holiday Acres v. Midwest Federal
Savings & Loan Association: Preemption of Due on Sale Clauses, 23 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 285 (1982) (examining whether Home Owners Loan Act preempts due on
sale clauses).
170. Mortgage acceleration is universally accepted. See David v. Sun Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 461 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1984); United States Sav. Bank v. Continental Fed. Arms,
Inc., 338 A.2d 579 (Del. Super. 1975); Walter v. Kilpatrick, 191 N.C. 458, 142 S.E. 148
(1926).
171. See supra note 168 for the text of the acceleration provision.
172. See United States v. Angel, 362 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (in same jurisdic-
tion as Mirabile, court finds acceleration permissible for waste); In re Tremblay, 43
Bankr. 221 (D. Vt. 1984) (dictum) (waste valid reason to accelerate mortgage); State
Farm Life Ins. v. Town and Country Assoc., 85 Ill. App. 3d 319, 406 N.E.2d 923 (1980)
(dictum) (waste warrants acceleration in proper circumstances); 78 AM. JUR.2D Waste
§ 13 (1975). A person who has a specific lien against real estate has a right to restrain
waste by the owner of the real estate. Id.
173. The debtor clearly harmed the interest of Maryland Bank & Trust:
1. Amount of Loan $335,000.00
2. Foreclosure sale $381,500.00
3. *Apparent profit $ 46,500.00 (1 minus 2)
4. Cost of Cleanup $551,713.00
5. Loss to Lender $216,713.00 (4 minus 1)
*This is not truly profit to the lender as he must return
the excess to the unsecured creditors. Most courts
allow the lender recovery to the extent of the security
and nothing more. Windfalls should return to the
debtor to replace lost equity.
632 F. Supp. at 575-76.
174. Assuming that the bank resides in a majority state that follows a lien theory,
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the bank will not acquire title,175 and the lender will not violate the
rubric of Maryland Bank 176 If title never passes to the lender, the
lender is unlikely to be classified as an owner under the most recent
amendments to CERCLA. 177 The appeal of acceleration fades in a few
jurisdictions. 178 In jurisdictions that follow title, rather than lien the-
ory, the title is normally in the custody of the mortgagee. 179 As a re-
sult, the lender in these jurisdictions already holds title and would
become an "owner" whether or not he used acceleration.' 80
Courts are wary of acceleration because it is a drastic remedy.18 1 A
the title remains in the mortgagor with the mortgagee holding the note and mortgage.
See Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1984) (in a lien state
mortgagee deemed only to have lien on real property, not actual title); Bredenburg v.
Landrum, 32 S.C. 215, 10 S.E. 956 (1890) (lien theory state considers mortgagor owner
of land); but see Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, 37 YALE
L.J. 691, 713-15 (1928) (neither lien state courts nor title state courts follow consistent
"party line"). See also Leipziger, The Mortgagee's Remedies for Waste, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 1086, 1087 (1976).
175. See 632 F. Supp. at 579. The court recognizes that passage of title is the im-
portant feature in establishing ownership.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 166 noting that the congressional response was in part a codifi-
cation of the Maryland Bank decision.
178. Thirteen states apparently follow the title theory, which holds that title re-
mains in the mortgagee until the mortgagor satisfies the obligation. In the early 19th
Century lenders favored this system believing that foreclosure would be unnecessary in
the event of default. Nevertheless, courts frowned upon this system and did not make
foreclosure any easier. Consequently, lien theory now is the majority rule in the United
States. See generally 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 439, 454 (1987);
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.2 (1979).
179. See generally 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 1, at 23-25; G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.1 (1979). See also Kratovil, Mortgagees-Problems in
Possession, Rents and Mortgage Liability, 11 DE PAUL L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1961) (distin-
guishing title and lien theory states). Other rights, such as an immediate right to take
possession and collect rents, attach to title states. See, e.g., Wethered v. Alban Tractor
Co., 224 Md. 408, 168 A.2d 358 (1961).
180. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Liability exists when title vests. In
a title theory state, the title vests in the mortagee when he executes the mortgage.
181. See e.g., First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271
(1976) (court will not allow acceleration if it imposes a penalty); Gunther v. White, 489
S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973) (acceleration not allowed if inequitable).
Nevertheless, acceleration is a bargained-for element, and courts should comply with
the wishes of the parties for two reasons. First, a substantial loan is not obtained for the
asking. Lenders run the risk that the security will be totally destroyed. The risk is
reduced if the lender knows that the debtor is obligated to keep the property in good
repair. Second, permitting acceleration of the due date is an added protection-that is,
the lender may take advantage of rising interest rates in the event his borrower transfers
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court will not use its equitable powers to enforce acceleration without a
showing that the mortgagor violated the agreement. 182 The lender
must show good faith when exercising the option to accelerate, 183 but
courts presume an acceleration clause is valid absent a showing of
fraud, 18 4 duress,185 or inequitable or unconscionable conduct'86 by the
lender.
V. ACCELERATION AS A REMEDY
Acceleration allows lenders to avoid the imputation of "ownership"
status, but few mortgagors will be willing or able to tender full pay-
ment at the demand of the lender.'" 7 Consequently, acceleration be-
the security. See Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla.
1977); See also Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578-79, 81
Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (1969); Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 701, 83 S.E.2d 811,
814 (1954) (parties bound regardless of whether contract wise or foolish).
182. See Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017-18
(Okla. 1977) (quoting Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 486 P.2d 190, 193 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1971)).
183. See Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 289 N.C. 620, 631, 224 S.E.2d
580, 588 (1976). In Crockett, the plaintiff attempted to establish that a Uniform Com-
mercial Code standard of good faith applied. Good faith is defined in the North Caro-
lina statute as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-1-201(19) (Supp. 1986). The North Carolina court disregarded the UCC
standard of good faith because an option to accelerate is one predicated upon a condi-
tion rather than "at will." The court applied a common law standard of good faith. See
infra note 186 addressing equitable conduct.
The good faith standard requires the lender to allege genuine impairment of the se-
curity. See Freeman v. Lind, 181 Cal. App.3d 791, 226 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1986). See also
H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1513 (3d ed. & 1973 Supp.) (the debtor must impair
the value of the mortgaged property).
184. See Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan v. American Medical Serv., 223 N.W.2d 921
(Wis. 1974) (no acceleration upon showing of fraud); Verna v. O'Brien, 78 Misc.2d 288,
356 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1974) (although mortgagee ungenerous, no fraud alleged and accel-
eration allowed).
185. See Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580
(1976) (oppression by mortgagee prevents acceleration); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis.2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973) (no acceleration
upon finding of duress).
186. See People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Ind., 22 Ohio App.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406
(1970) (no acceleration if inequitable or unconscionable); Malouff v. Midland Fed., 181
Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973) (en banc) (acceleration must comport with public
policy).
187. Imagine the debtor's reaction when his lender suddenly asks for the balance of
a substantial loan. Besides outrage, most debtors will view the contingency of "full
tender" as an impossiblity. The lender must prepare some method of refinancing the
unpaid balance. It is this refinancing plan that comprises the second step in the acceler-
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
156 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 35:129
comes a two-step process. The lender must declare an intent to
accelerate; 8' then the lender must help the debtor search for the funds
to pay the accelerated debt. The lender must be prepared to make refi-
nancing concessions to realize the accelerated debt."8 9 The following
second-step refinancing options fully exonerate the lender from liability
arising out of the collateral."90
ation hypothetical. In addition to the possibilities listed in the text, the new mortgage
agreement should include a clause that absolves the bank of hazardous waste liability.
Although this clause will be of no assistance to a mortgagee-turned-owner, it will shield
a nonforeclosing mortgagee from possible liability as a result of a mortgagor suit. At
least one court allowed private parties to contract out of hazardous waste liability. See
Mardan Corp. v. CGC Music, 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d
1254 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Recent Developments, Generator's Cleanup Liability Ex-
cused By Contract Release, Appeals Court Rules, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1337 (1986)
(private parties can contract regarding contribution, but this does not affect EPA right
to recover cleanup expenses).
188. See, eg., Ogden v. Gibralter Sav. Assoc., 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982) (notice
of acceleration is required); but see Spires v. Lawless, 493 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (mortgagee must only perform some overt act evidencing intent to accelerate).
189. Besides the three options listed in the text, the lender could request the bor-
rower to: (1) deposit money in an escrow fund from which the lender could utilize funds
to finance any subsequent cleanup; (2) refinance at an interest rate that would cover the
possible cleanup expense; or (3) request that the debtor obtain insurance to cover any
subsequent loss to the account of the lender. The lender is only limited by his creativity
in refinancing the loan.
Options one and two are illusory: Waste cleanups are so unpredictable that the ex-
pense is impossible to estimate. Any fund so reserved would be at best speculative and
would likely lull the lender into a false sense of security. The lender who chooses op-
tions one or two may be subject to liability in excess of the security.
Option three, on the other hand, is worth discussion. A debtor who obtains insur-
ance in favor of the lender, payable upon the occurrence of a waste spill, would satisfy
any lender's fear. Unfortunately, the insurance is unavailable. It is unavailable initially
because of a clause contained in most Comprehensive General Liability Policies (CGL).
The standard pollution exclusion provides in pertinent part:
The CGL policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage (1) arising
out of pollution or contamination caused by oil or (2) arising out of the discharge
of . . . [hazardous waste]; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Courts have examined this provision and found that it does not apply to reimburse
hazardous waste expenditures. See American Economy Ins. Co. v. Commons, 26 Or.
App. 153, 552 P.2d 612 (1976) (policies not meant to cover damage to property owned
by insured); but see Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 518
F.Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (coverage allowed); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983) (percolating water not owned by
the owner of the land under which it flows and does not fit within policy's exclusion).
See also Birnbaum, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage Issues in Haz-
ardous Waste Litigation, PRAc. REAL EST. LAW., Jan. 1986, at 37.
190. In contrast to the preceding note, these three hypotheticals are recognized
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MORTGAGE ACCELERATION
A. Substitution of the Hazardous Collateral
Acceleration extinguishes the mortgage and releases the security in-
terest.1 91 The lender will recover the unpaid balance, and the borrower
will hold title to the property.19 Nevertheless, acceleration without
foreclosure is unlikely unless the lender extends the funds to retire the
original debt.193 After retiring the primary obligation through the new
funds, the mortgage is released; but the lender must resecure this refi-
nanced debt. The lender appears in no better position to avoid liability.
The lender nevertheless has vastly improved his position. Most com-
panies own at least one parcel of "clean" real estate that can provide
loan security. If the company does not own any "clean" property, the
mortgagee may secure the corporate obligation with property held by
the corporation's directors. The substitution of collateral means that
the lender could foreclose with impunity upon default.
This strategy works well in practice.1 94 Acceleration has not yet
been utilized in the hazardous waste context, but nothing prevents its
application.' 9- Any argument that this scenario is against public pol-
icy can be dispelled.' 96 Nowhere is the EPA guaranteed a deep pocket
from which to collect cleanup expenditures." 7 What acceleration
methods of adjusting the collateral. The bank is in a much better position to avoid
liability by relying upon the lack of connection to the hazard rather than compensation
for a possible hazard.
191. Ideally, the borrower tendered the full amount owed and the mortgage is re-
leased. Although the lender may have to tender the acceleration dollars using the
debtor as a "straw man," the result is the same. That is, a mortgage will no longer exist
when the debt owed is satisfied. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1979) (foreclosure extinguishes the mortgage). The policies
underlying foreclosure and acceleration are similar; consequently, the mortgage termi-
nates upon the successful occurrence of either.
192. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 188 examining the likelihood of refinancing.
194. See In re O'Neill Ent., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Va. 1973). The O'Neill
court recognized that if the mortagage agreement so allows, the lender may request
substitution of the collateral. Id. at 295. Further, the lender may require the substitute
collateral have the average appraised security to satisfy the lender's interests.
195. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for an explanation of why waste
may be committed when a borrower contaminates the collateral.
196. What public policy is compromised by allowing the lender to restructure his
loan? The EPA is not left without a remedy; the EPA will simply have to collect its
expenses from the property itself. Furthermore, the chemical manufacturers that create
the toxic substances will be liable rather than the third-party lender. Thus cleanups will
still occur, cost recoveries will be had, and the lender will properly escape liability.
197. See supra note 29 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980 & Supp. I 1987), which
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means is that the EPA must collect all deficiencies from the mortgagor
rather than the mortgagee, so that the most responsible party will reim-
burse the EPA.
B. Substitute Bonds for the Hazardous Collateral
A lender may also resecure the debt with bonds," 8 which is an ap-
pealing solution for both parties. The borrower benefits because bonds
usually are sold for less than their face value, and the borrower avoids
encumbering additional property. 9 The bonds' complete isolation
from the hazardous site makes their use advantageous to the lender,
who may sell his bonds upon default without assuming hazardous
waste liability.
Again, the bank's reallocation of its security does not compromise
any recognized public policy.2"° The new arrangement protects both
the EPA and the lender in the event of future defaults.
C. Split the Mortgage into Several Debts
Splitting the collateral is simply a hybrid of the above approaches.2 °1
The mortgagee using this method would break the mortgage into
smaller individually secured debts. Ideally, the subsequent loans could
be secured by chattels in the debtor's possession.20 2 Unfortunately,
permits cost recovery actions. Nowhere in the statute is the EPA guaranteed a solvent
party from whom to collect the stated amount.
198. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 333 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In Penn,
the court allowed the railroad to substitute bonds for the collateral (trains and track)
that wore out before the borrower retired the debt.
199. For example, on March 5, 1970, a Gold Bond of $379,000.00 face value could
be purchased for $251,776.22, while its market value on that date was $168,655. See
generally 1 S. QUINDEY, BONDS & BONDHOLDERS RIGHTS & REMEDIES ch. 1, §§ 1-44
(1934) (section 39 deals with leasehold mortgage bonds).
The distinguishing feature of a bond is that it is an obligation to pay a fixed sum of
money in the future.
200. See supra note 197 discussing public policy implications.
201. In a split collateral arrangement, the mortgage is usually secured against real
property with any additional security taken against personal property of the debtor.
One case that involved this method is Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378
P.2d 97 (1963) (en bane) (in a loan secured by a chattel mortgage and three notes
against real property, lender must enforce rights against real property first).
202. This would reduce the likelihood of the borrower's connection to the hazard.
ous property. See Hetland & Hansen, The "Mixed Collateral"Amendments to Califor-
nia's Commercial Code-Covert Repeal of California's Real Property Foreclosure and
Antideficiency Provisions or Exercise in Futility?, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 189 (1987)
(generally examining the mixed-collateral problem).
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part of the loan may have to be secured with real property.2"3 The
lender who must partially secure upon distressed property is faced with
a problem. In many states, such a lender has a "mixed collateral prob-
lem." 2" Upon the debtor's default, the lender in many jurisdictions
must first attempt to satisfy the debt by foreclosing upon real prop-
erty2 5 - foreclosure that would necessarily create liability.
20 6
The California Legislature addressed this problem.207 Noting the
conflict between the real property and personal property foreclosure
systems, the legislature amended the Civil Code of California to con-
vert this single obligation into multiple separate obligations. 208 As a
result, a lender can enforce a personal property remedy before foreclos-
ing on real property.2 °9
VI. CONCLUSION
A lender should not enter into a loan transaction that may create
hazardous waste liability. Acceleration then will be unavailable because
that lender breached his duty of investigation. Nevertheless, for lenders
who unknowingly secured a debt with environmentally hazardous col-
lateral before the duty arose, this Note offers a creative solution to the
problem. Through acceleration and refinancing, the lender avoids being
classified as an owner. Although environmentalists will characterize
this idea as a statutory loophole, the statute clearly does not impose
203. Generally, the funds with which the debtor wants to operate or to purchase
real property exceed the value of any chattels on the land. Consequently, the lender
must obtain additional security. Real estate is the usual source of further security.
204. See Bernhardt, The Mixed Multiple Muddle, 9 REAL PROP. L. REP. 101
(1985).
205. See Hetland & Hansen, supra note 202, at 190 (a creditor who takes an interest
in even a small quantity of real property subjects the entire debt to the protection of the
real property system).
206. This foreclosure would establish the ownership that is clearly undesirable in
light of Maryland Bank. See supra notes 64, 127.
207. See UCC COMM. STATE BAR CAL., REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
CALIFORNIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 9501 (4) [hereinafter UCC COM-
MITTEE REPORT]. The Committee expressed concern about real and perceived interfer-
ence with the rights of mixed-collateral secured creditors.
208. See S.B. 1357, 1985 Cal. Legis. Serv. 799 (adding § 9501(4)(c)(iv) & (v)).
209. Id. See also UCC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 207, at 6. The Committee
considered whether to eliminate the subordination of the personal property system to
the real property system. A lender then could foreclose only the personal property
without implicating the real property laws.
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liability upon a nonowner - a group to which the accelerating lender
belongs.
The lender should not accelerate every loan but should experiment
with some of the more troublesome securities. Prudence is essential be-
cause acceleration will fail if the debtor can show an absence of good
faith, fraud, or unconscionable conduct by the lender.
Eric S. Lipper
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